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The Nonproliferation Treaty and the
"New World Order"
ABSTRACT

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT or
Treaty) faces either extinction or extension in 1995, when the NPT signatories will meet to decide its fate. Given the rapid changes in today's
nuclear technology and political environment, many states have expressed reservations about extending the Treaty. This Note considers the
implications of those reservations as well as arguments favoring extension. This Note reviews the birth of the atomic age and the terms of the
NPT and examines the Treaty's strengths and weaknesses. The author
concludes that the Treaty should remain in force and suggests strategies
for maintaining the support of member states and attracting other states
as the 1995 extension conference draws near.
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We have in this past year made great progress in ending the long era of
conflict and cold war. We have before us the opportunity to forge for
ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the
rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of the Atomic Age, 2 proliferation of nuclear
weapons has been a constant concern of the international community.3
With the possible exception of environmental degradation, nothing poses
a greater long-term threat to the Earth's well being than nuclear weapons.4 Early attempts to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons focused on keeping nuclear technology secret. 5 By the 1960s, however, it

became apparent that controlling proliferation would require more than
merely controlling the spread of technology.' Only international support
and cooperation can prevent widespread proliferation.
1. War in the Gulf The President;Transcript of the Comments by Bush on the Air
Strikes Against the Iraqis, N.Y. TrmEs, Jan. 17, 1991, at A14 [hereinafter Comments by
Bush].
2.

The Atomic Age began in August of 1945 when the United States detonated

atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki and awakened the world to the atom's awesome destructive power.
3. Ben Sanders, Non-ProliferationTreaty: A Broken Record?, BULL. AToM. ScIENTISTS, July-Aug. 1990, at 15, 17.

4. Burns H. Weston, Law and Alternative Security: Toward a Nuclear WeaponsFree World, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1077, 1077 (1990).

5. The United States initial method for promoting nuclear nonproliferation was
maintaining the technology's secrecy. NuclearProliferation:Future U.S. Foreign Policy

Implications: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Relations, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1975) (Statement of Myrun B. Kratzer) [hereinafter Kratzer

Statement].
6.

Sanders, supra note 3, at 17.
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This Note traces the evolution of nonproliferation policies beginning
with the United States early attempts at secrecy and continuing with
international efforts including the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT or Treaty).7 The Note then delineates those
Treaty provisions designed to implement the NPT's three primary objectives which are: (1) preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; (2) promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy; and (3) encouraging nuclear
disarmament.' The Note then describes those weaknesses in the NPT
regime that threaten the Treaty's continuance beyond the 1995 extension
meeting.9 The Note then identifies the NPT's successes and sets forth
several strategies for maintaining the support of member states and attracting the membership of other states to ensure the Treaty's continued
viability.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND

The Birth of the Atomic Age and Early Attempts at
Nonproliferation

In the wake of the atomic explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki,10
President Truman stated that the world faced a choice between "renun-

7. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July
1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
8. See id. at 484-86, 729 U.N.T.S. at 169-71.
9. Under article X of the NPT, member states must convene an extension meeting in
1995 to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty. Id. art. X, para. 2, at 494, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175.
10. The atomic bomb that the United States dropped over Hiroshima released an
amount of explosive power equivalent to 12,500 tons of TNT and killed over 100,000
people. JONATHAN SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH 11, 47 (1982). The development
of nuclear technology dramatically increased the destructive power of weapons. A Stanford Arms Control Group study describes the destructive power of a nuclear weapon as
follows:
Whereas the power for a conventional (chemical) explosion results from the energy that is released when the atoms are rearranged in the molecule, the power of
a nuclear explosion results from the tremendous quantity of energy that is released
when a nucleus of Plutonium 239 or Uranium 235 breaks into smaller pieces. The
nucleus can be made to fission in this way when it is struck by a neutron. When
the nucleus fissions, it also releases neutrons which can split other nuclei in a
chain reaction. The amount of energy released is enormous; the fission of one
nucleus releases about five million times as much energy as the explosion of one
molecule of TNT .... The development of the atomic bomb made it immediately

possible to increase the destructive capability of bombs by a factor of over 1,000.
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ciation of the use and the development of the atomic bomb" and a "desperate armament race which might well end in disaster." ' Despite Truman's warnings and several United States proposals to internationalize
nuclear energy at the end of World War II,2 the race to acquire nuclear
weapons began.
At the end of World War II, the United States was the only state
capable of producing a nuclear device, and its nuclear policies reflected a
strong desire to maintain that distinction."3 So as not to facilitate other
states' nuclear programs, the United States shrouded its program in utmost secrecy 4 and banned all exports of nuclear material and technology. 5 For a few years, the United States preserved its nuclear monopoly.
That monopoly, however, ended in 1949 when the Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear test. Thereafter, secrecy alone was no longer an
Kingdom,
effective curb to nuclear proliferation. 6 By 1964, the United
17
club.
"nuclear
the
joined
each
had
China
and
France,

STANFORD ARMS CONTROL GROUP, INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL: ISSUES AND
AGREEMENTS 46-47 (John H. Barton & Lawrence D. Weiler eds., 1976) [hereinafter
STANFORD GROUP].

11. President's Special Message to the Congress on Atomic Energy, PUB. PAPERS
362, 366 (Oct. 3, 1945) (Harry S. Truman).
12. In June 1946, Bernard Baruch, the United States representative to the United
Nations Atomic Energy Commission, introduced a plan (the Baruch Plan) in a speech at
the Commission's first meeting. Under the proposed plan, the United States agreed to
relinquish its nuclear arsenal to an international authority that would assume monopoly
control over nuclear energy. The United Nations Security Council would provide enforcement for the plan by imposing sanctions on any state found violating proposed plan
provisions. The Soviet Union, however, rejected the plan, fearing that the plan would
undermine its economic and security interests and that the United States might not carry
out its pledge to disarm. See STANFORD GROUP, supra note 10, at 66-72; The AchesonLilienthal Report of 1946, reprinted in PEACEFUL NUCLEAR POWER AND WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION 142-43 (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 1975) (written by Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Tennessee Valley
Authority Chairman David Lilienthal).
13. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982)) [hereinafter AEA]. Under § 1(b)(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, the United States refused to share its nuclear technology until "effective and enforceable safeguards against its use for destructive purposes [could] be devised." Section 5(a)(2) of the Act requires federal government ownership of all nuclear
material in the United States, and §§ 5(a)(2)-(3) forbids the export of fissionable
materials.
14. See supra note 5.
15. See AEA, supra note 13.
16.

LEONARD S. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TODAY 7 (1984).

17. The United Kingdom, France, and China detonated their first atomic bombs in
1952, 1960, and 1964, respectively. WILLIAM SWEET, THE NUCLEAR AGE: ATOMIC EN-
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President Eisenhower ushered the world into a new phase of nonproliferation in 1953 by introducing the, "Atoms for Peace" program in a
speech before the United Nations General Assembly."8 In his speech,
Eisenhower outlined a plan whereby the nuclear states 9 would cooperate with the nonnuclear states so that all could share in the "peaceful
benefits of the atom."' In addition, the plan called for the enactment of
the Atomic Energy Act of 195421 and the creation of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to safeguard all nuclear material.22 The
Atoms for Peace initiatives rested on the premise that if all states could
enjoy the peaceful benefits of the atom, there would be less incentive for
nonnuclear states to develop their own nuclear programs.23 The theory
was that indigenous programs were more likely to spawn nuclear material for military use than would programs developed pursuant to the Atoms for Peace plan.2 *
Worldwide support for additional proliferation controls increased after
the implementation of the Atoms for Peace program, and several treaties

ERGY, PROLIFERATION, AND THE ARMS RACE

120-26 (2d ed. 1988).

18. Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of
America, U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., 470th mtg., paras. 79-126, at 450-52 (Dec. 9, 1953)
[hereinafter Eisenhower Speech]; see also BENJAMIN N. SCHIFF, INTERNATIONAL NuCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: DILEMMAS OF DISSEMINATION AND CONTROL 45-57
(1983) (describing in detail the Atoms for Peace program).
19. The states possessing nuclear weapons in 1953 included the United States, the
Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. See id.
20. Eisenhower Speech, supra note 18. The peaceful benefits of nuclear energy indude the use and exploitation of the atom for energy and research as opposed to its

military use. D.M. Edwards, InternationalLegal Aspects of Safeguards and the NonProliferationof Nuclear Weapons, 33 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 1, 3 (1984).
21. See Eisenhower Speech, supra note 18. Congress established the AEA to govern
the transportation of nuclear equipment and materials. See generally AEA, supra note
13. It called for a cooperation agreement between the United States and other states
party to the AEA to establish controls and safeguards for the licensing and sale of nuclear fuel and reactors. Id.

22. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T.
1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter IAEA]. The IAEA's initial charge was to promote the
peaceful application of nuclear energy while preventing its military uses. The IAEA's
chief functions include: (1) reviewing nuclear facility design; (2) requiring states receiving nuclear material to maintain proper records for material accountability; (3) requiring
states receiving nuclear material to submit reports to the IAEA; (4) sending inspectors to
states that have received nuclear material to verify compliance with IAEA safeguards;
and (5) implementing article XII procedures should the Director General of the IAEA
determine that a state has not complied with IAEA safeguards. Edwards, supra note 20,
at 3-4.

23. See Kratzer Statement, supra note 5.
24. See id.

186
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resulted.25 The most important of these treaties are the Antarctic Treaty
of 1959,26 the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963,27 the Outer Space
Treaty of 1967,28 and the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967.29 While each

treaty was, and still is, successful in addressing some of the problems of
proliferation, each is too limited to completely address the problems that
vertical"0 and horizontal 3' proliferation pose. The United States, among
other states, saw a need for a more comprehensive treaty. 2

25. For a list of parties to the treaties, see
THE

LEGAL ADVISOR,

DEPARTMENT

TREATIES AFFAIRS

OF STATE, TREATIES

IN

STAFF,

OFFICE OF

FORCE: A LIST OF

TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN
FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1992 (1992) [hereinafter TREATIES IN FORCE]. See generally

P.K. Menon, Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons-InternationalEfforts to Protect the
Human Society from Wanton Destruction, 23 LAw/TECH., 3rd Quarter 1990, at 1, 1831.
26, The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. The
Antarctic Treaty demilitarized the Antarctic continent, making it the world's first nuclear-free zone. The Treaty provides, in part, that "any nuclear explosions in Antarctica
and the disposal there of radioactive waste material shall be prohibited." Id. art. V, para.
1, at 796, 402 U.N.T.S. at 76.
27. The Limited Test Ban Treaty, opened for signature Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T.
1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space,
and under water). Id.
28. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. The parties to the Treaty agreed
not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons, install such
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space. In addition, the
testing of any type of nuclear weapons in outer space was expressly prohibited. Id.
29. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, opened for
signatureFeb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 supplemented by Additional
Protocol I, 22 U.S.T. 786, 634 U.N.T.S. 360, and Additional Protocol II, 22 U.S.T.
754, 634 U.N.T.S. 364 [hereinafter Treaty of Tlatelolco]. The Treaty of Tlatelolco was
designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in the Southern hemisphere by creating a nuclear-free zone and allowing the peaceful development of nuclear energy. Id. at
preamble. Signatories of the treaty include: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. Four states have failed to make the treaty operative.
Brazil and Chile rejected certain safeguards; Argentina signed but refuses to ratify; and
Cuba has not signed. See SPECTOR, supra note 16, at 442 app. E.
30. Vertical proliferation is the further development or acquisition of nuclear weapons by states already possessing nuclear weaponry. See Nonproliferation Treaty Crucial
in Post-Cold-War World, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 11, 1991, at 19.
31. Horizontal proliferation is the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states not yet
possessing them. See id.
32. The United States has advanced several reasons in support of the need for fur-
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B.

The Nonproliferation Treaty

In 1961 an Irish-sponsored United Nations resolution introduced the
33
foundation for the first comprehensive nuclear regulatory regime.
Three years later, negotiations commenced, and by 1968 the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty was ready for signature.34 At that time there
were already five acknowledged nuclear-weapon states3 5 and in the coming decade the United States Atomic Energy Commission anticipated
there might be as many as twenty-eight such states. 36 Recognizing the
devastation that could result from a nuclear war and "believing ... the

proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of

ther proliferation controls. Among them are:
-Even a small nuclear arsenal could pose a direct security threat to the U.S. and
its allies. It might counter-balance U.S. conventional superiority and force an intolerable choice between risking nuclear retaliation or using overwhelming force,
perhaps including nuclear force, in the first instance;
-The introduction of nuclear explosives into a region could be politically destabilizing, touching off a local nuclear arms race with possible spillover effects in other
regions;
-The actual use or threat of use of nuclear explosives or their accidental detonation could escalate a local conflict into one involving the superpowers, with the
ever-present risk of global nuclear conflict;
-Additional members of the nuclear club might lack effective command and control structures or physical security capabilities, increasing the danger of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons;
-Increasing numbers of nuclear-weapon states would make the task of nuclear
disarmament substantially more difficult; and
-Given the public commitment by the United States to nonproliferation, acquisition of nuclear weapons by a U.S. ally could undermine U.S. credibility.
Jonathan B. Schwartz, Controlling Nuclear Proliferation: Legal Strategies of the
United States, 20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 5-6 (1988).
33.
Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear
Weapons, G.A. Res. 1653, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., 1063 plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/
PV.1063 reprinted in UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, Ser. I, vol. VIII, at 236 (Dusan
J. Djonovich ed., 1974); BEYOND 1995: THE FUTURE OF THE NPT REGIME 122 (Joseph F. Pilat & Robert E. Pendley eds., 1990) [hereinafter BEYOND 1995].

34. See BEYOND 1995, supra note 33.
35. The NPT lists five nuclear-weapon states. Under the NPT a nuclear-weapon
state is defined as any state that detonated a nuclear device before January 1, 1967. The
nuclear-weapon states in 1968 included China, France, the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. All other states in the NPT regime are referred to as
nonnuclear-weapon states. NPT, supra note 7, art. IX, para. 3, at 492-93, 729
U.N.T.S. at 174.
36. See Non-ProliferationTreaty: HearingsBefore the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 31 (1968).

188
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nuclear war," 37 sixty-two nations," including three nuclear-weapon
states,3 9 agreed to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.4 The Treaty entered into force March 5, 1970.41
Essentially, the NPT has three objectives: (1) to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons beyond the acknowledged nuclear-weapon states;4 2 (2)
to promote the peaceful use and application of nuclear energy among all.
states adhering to international safeguards;4 3 and (3) to encourage nuclear disarmament among those states possessing nuclear weapons." To
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond those states already possessing them, the signatories of the NPT agreed to abide by certain constraints, The nuclear-weapon states agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons to any other state or to assist any other state in acquiring such
weapons." The nonnuclear-weapon states promised not to manufacture
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons and not to seek or accept assistance in a nuclear weapons program. 6
Parties to the NPT were not content with merely attempting to curb
horizontal proliferation, vertical proliferation was also a serious con37. NPT, supra note 7, at preamble. One Swiss official summed up the dangers of
widespread proliferation as follows: "Between two nuclear powers it's a game of chess,
among four, it's bridge, among a dozen, it would be poker, roulette or any of those games
controlled by chance."

GEORGES FISCHER, THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR

31 (David Willey trans., 1971).
38. Sanders, supra note 3, at 16.
39. The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union signed the NPT.
China refused to participate in the negotiations and France rejected the Treaty on the
ground that without specific disarmament provisions the Treaty did not guarantee adequate security. Id.
40. See NPT, supra note 7. States adhering to the NPT account for approximately
98% of the world's nuclear power capacity, all of the world's enriched uranium, and
nearly all of the world's reprocessing capability. John H. Glenn, Nuclear Proliferation:

WEAPONS

The Current and Future Threat, IssuES Sci. & TECH., Winter 1985, at 28. For a list of

parties to the NPT, see TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 25, at 364.
41. The United States Senate delayed ratification of the Treaty after the Soviet
Union invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968, but approved the Treaty at President
Nixon's request in March 1970. Sanders, supra note 3, at 16.
42. NPT, supra note 7, arts. I, II, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171. Through articles I
and II, the NPT's goal was to freeze the number of nuclear-weapon states to the number
that existed in 1967. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 6-7.
43. NPT, supra note 7, art. IV, at 489-90, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172-73. The NPT does
not seek to prohibit trade promoting the peaceful application of nuclear energy so long as

states conduct that trade in accordance with the nontransfer and nonacquisition principles of
44.
45.
46.

the Treaty. See Schwartz, supra note 32, at 7.
NPT, supra note 7, art. VI, at 490, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173.
Id. art. VII, at 491, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173-74.
Id. art. I, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171.
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cern. 4 7 In response to vertical proliferation concerns, the NPT mandates
that all parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon states, pursue good faith
negotiations toward the cessation of the nuclear arms race with an aim
toward complete nuclear disarmament.4 8
Recognizing each party's right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, the NPT signatories agreed to promote the peaceful use and
application of nuclear energy among NPT members.4 9 To facilitate the
advancement of nuclear technology among all member states and to allow nonnuclear member states to reap the benefits of the peaceful atom,
the NPT calls for the "fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials,
and scientific and technological information. ' 50 Those parties in a position to do so pledged to help develop peaceful applications of nuclear
51
energy in the territories of nonnuclear-member states.
In return for assistance in developing their nuclear programs, the nonnuclear-weapon states agreed to place their nuclear facilities under
IAEA safeguards. 52 The IAEA's safeguards serve dual purposes. The
first is "to create a high [enough] probability of detection of unauthorized uses of nuclear material and to deter member states from breaching
the NPT. '53 The second is to provide assurance to NPT member states
that the terms of the Treaty are being honored and, in the event they are
not, to apprise the international community of any violations. 54
So that it can better implement its system of safeguards, the IAEA
requires each member state to establish and maintain an accounting system for tracking both the quantities and locations of all nuclear material
within its borders. 55 Comparing the quantities of nuclear materials on
record with the amount it finds during periodic on-site inspections, the
IAEA seeks to detect the diversion of "dangerous amounts '56 of fission-

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

1995, supra note 33, at 7-15.
NPT, supra note 7, art. VI, at 490, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173.
Id. art. IV, at 489-90, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172-73.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. III, at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.
Schwartz, supra note 32, at 8.
Id.

55.

Richard Bolt, Plutoniumfor All: Leaks in Global Safeguards, BULL.

BEYOND

ATOM.

SCIENTISTS, Dec. 1988, at 14, 15.
56. A diversion of a dangerous amount of fissionable material is defined as the diversion of a significant quantity of fissionable material within a certain conversion time. A
significant quantity is defined as enough nuclear material to make one crude bomb or
several sophisticated ones. Quantitatively, "8 kilograms of plutonium, 25 kilograms of
highly enriched uranium, 75 kilograms of low enriched uranium, or 8 kilograms of uranium 233" is enough to be considered significant. Id.
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able material.5 7 If the difference between the amounts measured and the
amounts indicated in the state's records is not within the limits of measurement error, the IAEA will suspect a possible diversion. 58 Possible
diversions are reported to the IAEA's Board of Governors which then
notifies the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly of
the IAEA's suspicions.5"
The NPT requires the application of IAEA safeguards to exports of
nuclear materials to states that are not signatories of the Treaty.60 This

requirement serves to ensure that transfers beyond the Treaty's reach do
not contribute to proliferation among nonparty states."1 The requirement
also serves to limit possible discriminatory effects favoring nonparty
states, which otherwise would not be subject to IAEA safeguards and
would be able to obtain nuclear materials from NPT parties.62
Adherence to the NPT's provisions is entirely voluntary. There are no
prescribed sanctions for violations, and a signatory state may withdraw
from the Treaty at any time upon three months notice if it determines
that extraordinary events jeopardize its interests. 3 The NPT mandates
five-year reviews 6 4 and the state parties must hold a conference in 1995
to determine the Treaty's renewal terms. 5

57. See id. The IAEA augments its inspections with containment and surveillance
methods that include cameras, video systems, and tamper-proof seals. See id.
58. Id.
59. IAEA, supra note 22, art. XII, para. C, at 1107-08, 276 U.N.T.S. at 28-30.
The IAEA may submit reports to the United Nations and the United Nations General
Assembly in the absence of an established violation if it suspects division but determines
itself unable "to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material ... to nuclear
weapons." INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INFORMATION CIRCULAR Doc.
INFCIRC/153/Corrected, para. 19 (1972) [hereinafter INFORMATION CIRCULAR]. The
IAEA safeguard process is essentially a recordkeeping, not a policing, activity. The

IAEA has no authority to impose sanctions against a state that diverts fissionable material to military purposes. Glenn, supra note 40, at 29.
60. NPT, supra note 7, art. III, para. 2, at 488, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172. Nonparty
states receiving nuclear material may satisfy IAEA safeguards pursuant to a model
agreement established by the IAEA "for the purpose of safeguarding specific projects or
facilities, rather than an entire nuclear program." Schwartz, supra note 32, at 8.
61. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 8.

62. Id. at 9.
63. Id. art. X, para. 1, at 493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175. Before withdrawing, a party
must notify all other signatories and the United Nations Security Council of its intention
to withdraw and include a statement in its notice relating the extraordinary events it
regards as having jeopardized its interests. Id.
64. NPT, supra note 7, art. VIII, at 491-92, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173-74.
65. Id. art. X, para. 2, at 494, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175. "Twenty-five years after entry
into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the treaty shall
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III.
A.

NPT,

SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

Problems from the Start

1. The Failure to Attract Key States
From its inception, the NPT has had flaws. Its most notable defect
was its failure to bind several key states, in particular, China and
France.66 Without the support of two of the five nuclear-weapon states
and numerous other nonnuclear-weapon states, the impact of the NPT
was severely weakened.17 Since 1968, the number of signatories has increased to approximately 150 6 -the largest number of parties to any
arms control pact. 9 The failure to attract signatories remains a problem,
however, because a number of key states refuse to sign. Most notably, six
threshold states-Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan, and South
Africa-remain outside the NPT's regime.70 Each of these states is believed to have either constructed a nuclear device or to soon have the

continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the parties to the Treaty." Id. See
generally Thomas Graham, Jr., The Duration of the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty:
Sudden Death or New Lease on Life?, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 661 (1989).
66. While France did not sign the Treaty, it declared in 1968 its intention to act in
accordance with the Treaty. See Disarmament and Related Matters 1968, 1968
U.N.Y.B. 9, U.N. Sales No. E.70.I.1. As of January 1993, both France and China had
joined the NPT. Secretary of State Eagleburger, Remarks at an Open Forum at the
State Department (Jan. 15, 1993).
67. See Pamela E. Kulsrud, Nuclear Non-Proliferationfor the 80's: Carrot and
Stick Policy Reexamined, 13 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 25, 34 (1987). Today there are approximately 150 NPT signatories. States notably absent from the list include: Algeria, An-

gola, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Chile, Comoros, China, Cuba, Djibouti, Guyana, India,
Israel, North Korea, Mauritania, Monaco, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, and Vanuatu. See TREATIES IN FORCE, supra note 25, at 364.

68.

Jayantha Dhanapala, Disappointment in the Third World, BULL. ATOM.
July-Aug. 1990, at 30.
69. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 15.
70. Bombs Away, ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 1990, at 17. Of the six states, only India has
made a confirmed nuclear detonation. Each, however, maintains some of its nuclear facilities outside IAEA safeguards. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 15. See generally KATHLEEN
SCIENTISTS,

C. BAILEY, DOOMSDAY WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF MANY: THE ARMS CONTROL

CHALLENGE OF THE '90S 17-36 (1991) (discussing states that maintain unsafeguarded
nuclear programs). The failure to attract key states to the treaty has prompted one commentator to write "What is the point of a nonproliferation treaty that does not include
the most determined proliferators .

. . ."

Bombs Away, supra at 17.
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technology and capability to do so. 1
Argentina and Brazil have both pursued plans to develop unsafeguarded plutonium and uranium reprocessing facilities. 2 India detonated a nuclear device in May of 1974 and is believed to be stockpiling
plutonium. 3 It is widely acknowledged that Israel possesses undeclared
nuclear weapons and has the capability of producing weapons-grade material.7 4 Pakistan has engaged in industrial espionage, stealing7 5 plans
from a Dutch company for use in its nuclear weapons program.
Ease of Withdrawal

2.

Another serious shortcoming of the NPT is its withdrawal provision.
Under the NPT's terms, a party may choose to withdraw from the
Treaty after giving the other parties and the United Nations Security
Council three months advance notice and a statement of the extraordinary events that jeopardize its interests.7 6 While other arms control treaties provide similar withdrawal provisions, 77 in the case of the NPT, a
duplicitous state could easily use the NPT and its liberal withdrawal
provision to defeat the Treaty's purpose. A state seeking nuclear weapons capability could join the NPT to gain access to the equipment,
materials and technology necessary to develop a peaceful nuclear program.7 8 After some initial assistance from nuclear-weapons states, the

former state could then exercise its right to withdraw and take with it
the acquired capability and technology to proceed with its own unsafeguarded, nuclear weapons program.7 9 To date, however, no state has
71.

Bombs Away, supra note 70, at 17.

72. See Glenn, supra note 40, at 33. Neither Argentina nor Brazil is a party to the
NPT or the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. For example, A.Q. Khan, a top member of Pakistan's nuclear program, was
accused and convicted in absentia for stealing plans for a centrifuge facility from a
Dutch company. Id.
76. NPT, supra note 7, art. X, para. 1, at 493, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175.
77. Several other arms control treaties provide similar withdrawl provisions. See
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, art. IV, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (three months notice
required for withdrawal); Seabed Arms Control Treaty, art. VIII, Feb. 11, 1971, 23
U.S.T. 701, 955 U.N.T.S. I (three months notice required for withdrawal); Treaty on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, art. XV, para. 2, May 26, 1972, 23
U.S.T. 3435, 3446 (six months notice required for withdrawal).
78. NPT, supra note 7, art. IV, para. 1, at 489, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172-73.
79. Scott J. Ulm, Non-ProliferationAfter Baghdad, FLEOTCHER FORUM, Winter
1982, at 170, 172. "So Iraq's nuclear program may continue in an ostensibly peaceable
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exercised its right of withdrawal."0
3.

Some Military Applications Not Precluded by the NPT

Although the nonnuclear-weapon states agree not to receive, manufacture, or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
nothing in the NPT forbids them from using nuclear energy for other
purposes.8 1 For example, under the NPT, nonnuclear-weapon states are
free to develop nuclear energy for naval propulsion systems.82 Because
IAEA safeguards do not apply to nuclear material used in military activities that does not involve weaponry, a state may withdraw and exclude
unlimited quantities of nuclear material from safeguarded systems for
use in nonexplosive military activities. 83 Although no state has exercised
its right to withdraw material from IAEA safeguards, the existence of
that right poses a potentially significant exception to the Treaty's verification requirements."4
4.

Discrimination Between the "Haves" and "Have-Nots"

Discrimination has been a constant source of disillusionment for the
nonnuclear-weapon states.8 5 Nonnuclear-weapon states claim the NPT
is unfair for several reasons. One is the NPT's express division between
nuclear-weapon states and nonnuclear-weapon states.88 Many nonfashion, yet, beneath the surface will always lurk the possibility that Iraq will turn to a
dedicated weapons program with reactors constructed specifically for that purpose. Perhaps the civilian, safeguarded facilities will never be used to make explosives, but the
knowledge and training gained through them may serve a military program quite well
indeed". Id. at 173-74.
80. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 14.
81. NPT, supra note 7, art. II, at 487, 729 U.N.T.S. at 171; Schwartz, supra note
32, at 13-14.
82. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 13-14.
83. Id. at 14. Before withdrawing nuclear materials from IAEA safeguards, a state
must show that its use of the material will not violate the NPT. Id. The state must
arrange with the IAEA to confirm the period and circumstances of withdrawal. Id.
Thereafter, the state must keep the IAEA informed of the type and quantity of material
withdrawn. Id. The state must replace any amounts withdrawn under IAEA safeguards
if the state reintroduces the material into nonmilitary use. INFORMATION CIRCULAR,
supra note 59, para. 14; Schwartz, supra note 32, at 59.
84. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 14.
85. See generally Ashok Kapur, Dump the Treaty, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, JulyAug. 1990, at 21-22. Kapur calls the Treaty a system of "atomic apartheid" that favors
the nuclear weapon states over the nonnuclear-weapon states. Id.
86. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 9. This distinction has been cited "as evidence that
the burdens of the NPT fall predominantly and unfairly upon its nonweapon parties."
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nuclear-weapon states question the fairness of a system that allows nuclear-weapon states to retain the right to develop their nuclear arsenals
while denying that right to everyone else.8 7 In the eyes of some states,
such as Argentina, Brazil and India, the NPT merely serves to perpetuate the distinction between states that have nuclear weapons and those
that do not.88
Other charges of discrimination stem from the nuclear-weapon states'
slow progress in pursuing nuclear disarmament negotiations.8 9 Many
nonnuclear-weapon states consider the disarmament measures implemented thus far insufficient, ° especially in light of the nuclear weaponstates' failure to agree on a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.9 1
Without the nuclear-weapon states' fulfilling their obligation, many nonnuclear-weapon states question the need to meet their own obligations. 2
Indeed, some parties to the NPT have stated publicly that the future of
nuclear-weapon states fulfill their oblithe Treaty hinges on whether the
93
gation to pursue disarmament.

Another grievance of the nonnuclear-weapon states is the perceived
special relationships between some nuclear-weapon states and nonnuclear-weapon states. 4 Some nonparty states that share close relations
with nuclear-weapon states have become capable of producing nuclear
devices." A disparity results when nonnuclear-weapon nonparties re-

Id. The United States and other nuclear-weapon states, however, have taken steps to
minimize discrimination. Id.

87. Keeping it in the Nuclear Family, NEw

SCIENTIST,

Sept. 22, 1990, at 19.

88. Sanders, supra note 3, at 15. "Despite the reality of power imbalances, Third
World states believe passionately in the equality of nations. They cannot accept the assumption that nuclear deterrence is good for some and bad for others." Id. Dhanapala,
supra note 68, at 31.
89. See NPT, supra note 7, art. VI, at 400, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173.
90. Dhanapala, supra note 68, at 31 (stating that as of 1990, the United States and
Soviet Union had over twice as many nuclear warheads as they had in 1972). "It is fair
to say that the disarmament element of the treaty ... has not served with much effect
during the treaty's first 20 years." Sanders, supra note 3, at 17; see, e.g., The Second
Review Conference, [1980] 5 Y.B. Disarmament 128, U.N. Sales No. E.81.IX.3.
91. Sanders, supra note 3, at 17.
92. See Dhanapala, supra note 68, at 31.

93. Graham, supra note 65, at 664-65.
94. Ronald J. Bettauer, The Nuclear Non-ProliferationAct of 1978, 10

POL'Y INT'L

LAW

&

Bus. 1105, 1137 (1978). There are at least three states that are not parties

to the NPT with which the United States has active nuclear agreements-Argentina,

Brazil, and India. See id.
95. Dhanapala, supra note 68, at 31. "The eagerness of France, the Soviet Union
and China to do nuclear business with non-signatories to the NPT only serves to weaken
the ... treaty." Sanders, supra note 3, at 18.
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ceive nuclear material subject to safeguards only on the transferred
items, while the nonnuclear-weapon parties must accept safeguards on
their entire nuclear programs.9 6 Many nonnuclear-weapon states fail to
see the value in being a member to a treaty that provides the same bene97
fits to nonmembers as it does to members.
Nonnuclear-weapon states also express concern over the system of
safeguards. 98 Under the NPT only nonnuclear-weapon states are required to accept IAEA safeguards. 99 This, many nonnuclear-weapon
states argue, is inherently unfair and puts them at a commercial disadvantage relative to the nuclear-weapon states which are not subject to the
safeguards. 0 0 The disadvantage arises from two sources. One source is
the IAEA's intrusive inspections which result in the loss of industrial
secrets and interference with state operations."'0 The other source is the
sheer cost of compliance with the safeguard system. 2
5. Faulty Technological Assumptions
Under the NPT, there is a distinction between peaceful uses and military uses of nuclear material. The NPT calls for the nonnuclear-weapon
states to use nuclear material for peaceful purposes and to forgo military
uses."0 ' In practice, however, the distinction between such uses is imprecise.? ° For example, many technologies useful in producing nuclear material for civilian programs are adaptable for military use." 5 In addition,
IAEA safeguards were supposed to assure that the transfer of peaceful

96. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 8-9.
97. Dhanapala, supra note 68, at 31.
98. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 10-11. The United States has attempted to alleviate
these concerns by voluntarily accepting IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities except
those with direct national security significance and by imposing the same safeguard requirements on all states receiving its nuclear exports. See id. at 11.
99. NPT, supra note 7, art. III, para. 1, at 487-88, 729 U.N.T.S. at 172.

100. See Schwartz, supra note 32, at 10-11.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See NPT, supra note 7.
104. "The division between civilian and military atoms is inherently ambiguous. As
nuclear power and research programs become more advanced, the knowledge and facilities obtained grow ever closer to the skills and accoutrements of the bombmaker." Ulm,
supra note 79, at 171.
105. Sanders, supra note 3, at 17. The powerful computers, advanced machine tools,
and nuclear fuel necessary to conduct a civilian nuclear power plant are readily adaptable to a weapons program. See U.S. High-Tech Aided Iraq, U.N. Expert Says, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 28, 1992, at 3.
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nuclear technologies would not assist military programs. 06 However, applying IAEA safeguards at certain types of nuclear facilities has proven
107
to be more difficult than expected.
Recognizing these problems, some nuclear-weapon states have restricted exports of equipment and technology-even to NPT parties.01
These restrictions have created friction between the nuclear-weapon and
nonnuclear-weapon states.1 09 Those nuclear-weapon states that refuse to
provide nonnuclear-weapon states with advanced nuclear technology
base their refusal on article II of the NPT, which prohibits nuclearweapon states from assisting nonnuclear-weapon states in the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons.1 10 The nonnuclear-weapon
states challenge that position, arguing that withholding nonmilitary nuclear technology is discriminatory and contravenes the NPT provision
that guarantees nonnuclear-weapon states the right to develop their own
civilian nuclear programs.11 1
Another potential cause for friction between the nuclear-weapon and
nonnuclear-weapon states is the issue of "peaceful nuclear explosions." ' 2 Under the NPT, the benefits from any peaceful applications of
nuclear explosions must be made available to nonnuclear-weapon states
party to the Treaty on a nondiscriminatory basis. 1 3 In other words, nuclear-weapon states must provide peaceful nuclear explosive services for
nonnuclear-weapon states requesting such services; however, the nuclearweapon states need not provide the nonnuclear-weapon states access to
the underlying technology. 4 Since the drafting of this provision, however, peaceful nuclear explosions have proven to have little practical
value and to cause serious environmental harm.11 5 It is unlikely, there-

106. Ulm, supra note 79, at 171.
107. Nuclear facilities handling enriched uranium and plutonium have proven to be
especially difficult to safeguard. Sanders, supra note 3, at 17.
108. Id. "[N]uclear supplier states are increasingly restricting exports of equipment
and technology that might be used to develop nuclear weapons, even if all the buyer's
nuclear installations are subject to the safeguards of the [IAEA]." Id. at 16.
109. Id. at 17. The friction between the nuclear-weapon and nonnuclear-weapon
states has manifested itself in the nonnuclear-weapon states' threats to vote against the
extension of the NPT in 1995. See Dhanapala, supra note 68, at 30.
110, See Ulm, supra note 79, at 172.

111. See id.
112. Sanders, supra note 3, at 17. Peaceful nuclear explosions have been used for oil
exploration, for excavation, and for other types of geological projects. See Moscow's Dirty
Nuclear Secrets, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 10, 1992, at 46.
113. NPT, supra note 7, art. V, at 400, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173.
114. Sanders, supra note 3, at 17.
115. Id. See generally Moscow's Dirty Nuclear Secrets, supra note 112, at 46.
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fore, that the nuclear-weapon states will honor requests for assistance
with peaceful nuclear explosions.""' Although no state has requested
such services, some states have criticized the fact that there is a strong
likelihood that the services the NPT promises will not be available to
11

them.

6.

7

IAEA's Lack of Effectiveness

Under the NPT regime, the IAEA's primary mission has changed
from promoting nuclear energy to monitoring and safeguarding nuclear
material.1 1 Fulfilling this mission is difficult." 9 With only 192 inspectors, 20 the IAEA is responsible for safeguarding nuclear activities at 992
nuclear installations in more than 50 states around the world. 21 Its lack
of resources has allowed the IAEA to inspect only the most sensitive
facilities, leaving many facilities unsafeguarded."' In 1986, approxi23
mately 300 nuclear installations operated without inspection.'
Even if the IAEA had sufficient resources to inspect all nuclear facilities, significant diversions could still occur. According to a leaked confidential IAEA report, the theft of enough material to construct a nuclear
device has approximately a five percent chance of going unnoticed under
the current safeguards. 124 In fact, the margin of error inherent in IAEA
safeguards is so great that at a large nuclear facility, enough material to
make nearly six nuclear bombs could be diverted without detection.125
IAEA failures are well documented. The most recent and egregious
example is the IAEA's failure to detect Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program." 6 Iraqi efforts to construct a nuclear bomb should have

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See DAVID FISCHER, STOPPING
PAST AND THE PRosPECTs 52-54 (1992).

THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE

119. See generally Bolt, supra note 55, at 15.
120. Id. at 16.
121. Id.
122. Glenn, supra note 40, at 35. After the Gulf War, lack of funds forced the
IAEA to halt inspections of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Cash Crisis Halts Iraq
Nuclear Inspections, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 11, 1991, at 11.
123. Bolt, supra note 55, at 16.
124. Id. at 14-15.
125. Id. "The amount of material flowing through a reprocessing facility leaves a
certain amount of the weapons-usable plutonium in valves, pipes, and tanks. This 'material unaccounted for' (MUF) could conceivably be used to camouflage the diversion of
small, but adequate, amounts of material for military use." Ulm, supra note 79, at 172.

126. See Agency Seeks New Controls on Nuclear Material, CHI.
1991, at 18.

TRIB.,

Dec. 7,
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been apparent to the IAEA because Iraq was, and still is, a member of
the NPT and was therefore subject to IAEA safeguards. 12 7 Numerous
events should have put the IAEA on notice of Iraq's intentions. For example, in June 1981, Israeli planes attacked and destroyed an almost
completed Iraqi nuclear reactor, claiming Iraq intended to use the reactor to produce material for nuclear weapons. 128 Futhermore, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's 2 " emphasis on the need for Arab states to pos130
sess atomic weaponry has been well publicized for many years.
Finally, Iraq's attempts to buy krytons-complex nuclear triggering devices-from a United States company collapsed recently in a joint United
States-British sting operation.' 3 ' Yet, despite all these warning signs, the
IAEA declared nothing amiss with Iraq's nuclear program." 2 Meanwhile, by most estimates, Iraq was only a few years away from making a
nuclear bomb when the Allies bombed Iraq's nuclear facilities during the
first hours of the Gulf War.133 Through its actions, Iraq showed the
world that a state could fulfill its obligations under the NPT, be subject
to IAEA safeguards, and still maintain a full-scale nuclear weapons program. 3 Iraq's success and the IAEA's failure illustrate the limitations
of the NPT. 30
Iraq is just one of many signatories to the NPT that has faced accusations of maintaining clandestine nuclear weapons programs. Iran, Libya,
North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan, all members of the NPT regime, are widely suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons programs. 3 6
For many states, the costs of proliferation no longer seem to outweigh
the benefits.13 7 If these states continue to use the Treaty to cast a cloak of

127. Ulm, supra note 79, at 170.
128. Id. Israel justified its attack on national security grounds, claiming Iraq intended to use the facility to produce nuclear weapons. Id. (citing Israeli and Iraqi Statements on Raid on Nuclear Plant, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1981, at A8).
129. Saddam Hussein has been Iraq's president since 1979 and has been a major
political figure in that state since 1967. See generally EFRAIM KARSH & INARI RAurTSI,
SADDAM HUSSEIN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (1991).
130. See It's Broke, So Fix It, ECONOMIST, July 27, 1991, at 13.
131. Jill Smolowe, The Big Sting, TIME, Apr. 9, 1990, at 44-45.
132. It's Broke, So Fix It, supra note 130, at 13.
133. Iraq is not the Problem, NEw SCIENTIST, July 27, 1991, at 9.
134. George W. Rathjens & Marvin M. Miller, Nuclear Proliferation After the
Cold War, TECH. REV., Aug.-Sept. 1991, at 24, 32. "Saddam Hussein's ability to get so
close to a bomb without detection reveals the whole regulatory system is inadequate."
Iraq is not the Problem, supra note 133, at 9.
135. See Schwartz, supra note 32, at 13.
136. Glenn, supra note 40, at 33-34; Sanders, supra note 3, at 17-18.
137. Bombs Away, supra note 70, at 17. For example, despite Israel's preemptive
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respectability over their nuclear programs, other states may be tempted
either to do the same or to simply withdraw from the Treaty.138 Moreover, states considering joining the NPT will be hesitant to sign a Treaty
that cannot police its own members.1" 9
7.

Enforcement of International Law

Like many international multilateral treaties, the NPT suffers from
the perspective of enforcement. Nowhere in the NPT are there enforcement provisions to remedy its violation. Even if the NPT contained enforcement provisions, international law has no mechanism to compel a
state's compliance.1 4 Each state, under international law, has the right
at all times to maintain its sovereignty."' Thus, the Treaty is unenforce1 42
able and nonbinding.
8.

Ease of Construction

One assumption upon which the drafters based the NPT was that
only governments-as opposed to nongovernment groups-would be capable of producing nuclear weapons. Underlying this assumption is the
fact that the construction of the original atomic bombs required tremendous amounts of scientific expertise and vast sums of money. 4 3 Today,
however, construction of a nuclear device is much easier than it was in
1945.144
Most states today have a "cadre of well-educated scientists capable of
mastering the secrets of nuclear weapons and the precision tools necessary to construct them. ' 145 The most significant factor preventing a state
from constructing a nuclear device is the lack of availability of fissile
attack on Iraq's nuclear reactors in 1981, Iraq has continued its quest for nuclear weapons. See Ulm, supra note 79, at 173.
138. It's Broke, So Fix It, supra note 130, at 13.
139. Bombs Away, supra note 70, at 17.

140. Kulsrud, supra note 67, at 37.
141. See id. at 38-39.
142. Id.

Absent any international machinery to implement current international law, a
new law cannot bind a state involuntarily. This principle derives from the doctrine
of positivism, which teaches that international law is the sum of rules by which
states have consented to be bound, and that no principle or convention can be law
if the state has not consented.
Id. at 37 n.94.
143. ToM CLANCY, Afterword to THE SUM OF ALL FEARs 797 (1991).
144. See BAILEY, supra note 70, at 8-16.
145. Id. at 8.
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material such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium.1 46 As time
passes, however, the limiting nature of this factor continues to diminish.
Some estimate that by the year 2000, there will be more commercially
produced and separated plutonium in existence than all the plutonium
contained in all of the military stockpiles in the nuclear-weapon states.1 47
In the afterword to his recent novel, The Sum of All Fears,Tom Clancy
illustrates the relative ease in which a nuclear bomb can be constructed:
I was first bemused, then stunned, as my research revealed just how easy
[constructing a nuclear bomb] might be today. It is generally known that
nuclear secrets are not as secure as we would like-in fact the situation is
worse than even well-informed people appreciate. What required billions
of dollars in the 1940s is much less expensive today. A modem personal
computer has far more power and reliability than the first Eniac, and the
"hydrocodes" which enable a computer to test and validate a weapon's
design are easily duplicated. The exquisite tools used to fabricate parts
can be had for the asking. When I asked explicitly for the specifications
for the very machines used at Oak Ridge and elsewhere, they arrived Federal Express the next day. Some highly specialized items designed specifically for bomb manufacture may now be found in stereo speakers. The
fact of the matter is that a sufficiently wealthy individual could, over a
period of from five to ten years, produce a multistage thermonuclear device. Science is all in the public domain, and allows few secrets.1 48
As fissionable material becomes more widely available, states as well
as terrorist groups will have the capability to construct a nuclear
weapon. Most experts agree that the threat of nuclear terrorism is increasing.1 49 The Nuclear Control Institute (NCI), a private association
comprised of numerous nuclear experts,' 50 cautions that it is entirely
146.

Gordon Thompson, Treaty a Useful Relic, BULL.

ATOM. SCIENTISTS,

July-

Aug. 1990, at 32.
147. Id. "By the year 2000, the total plutonium produced as a by-product of global
nuclear power will be the equivalent of I million atomic bombs. The worst hazards will

come, not from U.S. enrichment of uranium or separation of plutonium for its own
power plants, but from up to 100 countries that may be doing the same thing." RESEARCH AND POLICY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, NuCLEAR ENERGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY: A STATEMENT ON NATIONAL POLICY 8

(1976) [hereinafter NUCLEAR ENERGY].
148. CLANCY, supra note 143, at 797; see

NUCLEAR ENERGY, supra note 147, at 8
(relating to ease of constructing an atomic bomb).
149. Eliot Marshall, If Terrorists Go Nuclear, SCIENCE, July 11, 1986, at 148.
150. The list of experts working with NCI include Rear Admiral Thomas Davies
(USN, retired); Harold Agnew, the former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory; Yuval Ne'eman, an Israeli physicist; Admiral Stansfield Turner, former CIA chief;
and Bertram Wolfe, Vice President and Manager of General Electric's nuclear energy
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possible for a terrorist group to obtain the technology and equipment
necessary to construct its own nuclear bomb.15
9.

The Treaty's Duration

Another flaw related to the withdrawal provisions is their potential
limitations upon the NPT's duration. By its terms, the NPT requires
the parties to convene in 1995 to decide the Treaty's fate. 52 By a majority vote, the parties may agree to extend the Treaty indefinitely, extend
it for a fixed period of time, or simply terminate it.' 53 Preliminary statements from various parties to the NPT indicate the Treaty's future is
threatened.'5 Some Third World states have condemned the NPT's discriminatory role and have expressed their desire to allow the Treaty to
automatically expire in 1995,155 unless all parties take action, the NPT
and its goals may be jeopardized.'
B.

The NPT: "A Useful Relic"

1. Cornerstone of the Nonproliferation Regime
Despite its weaknesses, the NPT has enjoyed success in curbing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and in providing a framework for
peaceful nuclear uses.' 5" The number of signatories to the NPT has
grown steadily since 1970, and today with approximately 150 members,

it has a greater number of signatories than any other arms control treaty
in history.' 58 In addition, the NPT serves as the cornerstone of the
division. Id.
151.
152.

Id. at 148-49.
NPT, supra note 7, art. XI, para. 2, at 494, 729 U.N.T.S. at 175.

153. Id.
154. Graham, supra note 65, at 661.
155. Id. Graham posits that the NPT's terms constrain the parties to choose between
continuing the Treaty indefinitely or for a fixed period of time. He argues that if they
reach no consensus the Treaty will continue in force automatically until the parties agree
otherwise. Id.; see also Ashok Kapur, Dump the Treaty, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS,
July-Aug. 1990, at 21 (stating that the NPT is a "system of atomic apartheid" founded
on "false bases"); Dhanapala, supra note 68, at 31 ("Despite the reality of power imbalances, Third World states believe passionately in the equality of nations. They cannot
accept the assumption that nuclear deterrence is good for some and bad for others.").
156. See Thompson, supra note 146, at 32.
157. Graham, supra note 65, at 665; see Lewis A. Dunn, It Ain't Broke-Don't Fix
It, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, July-Aug. 1990, at 19, 20 ("The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty works. It makes an essential contribution to global peace and security.").

158. Graham, supra note 65, at 663.
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world's nonproliferation regime. It is widely regarded as one of the most
effective multilateral arms control agreements ever reached. 15 9 The
NPT's checks and balances have helped to ensure that nonnuclearweapon states use nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes and
have also served as a springboard for nuclear arms reduction treaties
among the nuclear-weapon states.""' The Treaty has had some success in
preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional states.1 6
Only one state, India, has detonated a nuclear device since the Treaty
entered into force, and no state has openly acquired or deployed a nuclear arsenal.1 2
2.

Strong Commitment

Despite the few states that continue to disregard their obligations
under the NPT, virtually all of the Treaty's members have shown a
genuine commitment to abide by its terms.1 63 This commitment has encouraged nonproliferation by assuring those states that their agreement
to forgo nuclear weapons is being matched by other nonnuclear-weapon
states. 64 For example, Canada and Sweden are capable of producing
nuclear weapons but have chosen not to do so."65 Based in part on their
confidence in the NPT regime, they have refrained from producing nu66
clear weapons.'
3.

Peaceful Applications

The NPT has facilitated the exchange of equipment, materials, and
technological information for peaceful applications of nuclear energy.' 67
States possessing nuclear technology have assisted nonnuclear states in
the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy."6 The NPT,
in conjunction with IAEA safeguards, allows such commerce to proceed
159. Keeping it in the Nuclear Family, supra note 87, at 19.
160. Id. For example, President Lyndon Johnson announced the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT) on July 1, 1968-the day the NPT opened for signature.
Peter Grose, U.S. and Soviets Agree to Parleyson Limitation of Missile Systems: Ban on
Atom Arms Spread Signed, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2, 1968, at 1.
161. Graham, supra note 65, at 665.
162. Id. at 664. India detonated a nuclear device in 1974. Dunn, supra note 157, at
19.
163. Dunn, supra note 157, at 19.
164. See id.
165. Sanders, supra note 3, at 18; see Glenn, supra note 40, at 29.
166. See Sanders, supra note 3, at 18.
167. See NPT, supra note 7, art. IV, para. 2, at 489-90, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173.
168. Dunn, supra note 157, at 19.
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while providing assurances that the trade will not contribute to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. 6 9 Although the NPT has fostered a
legitimate nuclear trade, the NPT's system of safeguards has made it
costly and difficult for states to acquire the materials, components, and
technology necessary to construct nuclear weapons.' 7 0
4.

Symbol of Opposition

The NPT symbolizes international opposition to the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and embodies the idea that nuclear proliferation is a
threat to international peace and stability.' A negative aura now surrounds the very idea of nuclear proliferation. 72 The acquisition of nuclear weapons by a previously nonnuclear-weapon state is now met with
worldwide condemnation. 1 3 What was once an act of national pride has
become an act of international outlawry.174 The swift and stern international condemnation 7 5 of India's nuclear explosion in 1974 prompted
India to abandon its nuclear weapons program. 1 6 India has not detonated a nuclear device since 1974. 117 In the face of world opinion, most
states today are reluctant to reveal any ambitions of acquiring nuclear
weapons. 178

169. Graham, supra note 65, at 666.
170. Dunn, supra note 157, at 19.
171.

Id.

172.

Graham, supra note 65, at 665.

173. Dunn, supra note 157, at 19.
174.

Graham, supra note 65, at 665.

175. See, e.g, Statement by Prime Minister Bhutto on Indian Nuclear Explosion,
May 19, 1974, reprinted in UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARNAMENT
(1974) [hereinafter DISARMAMENT];
Statement by the Japanese Representative (Nisibori) to the Conference of the Committee

AGENCY, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 146-48

on Disarmament: Indian Nuclear Explosion, May 21, 1974, reprinted in
MENT

DISARMA-

150-51 (1974); Statement by the Swedish Representative (Eckerberg) to the Con-

ference of the Committee on Disarmament: Indian Nuclear Explosion, May 21, 1974,
reprinted in DISARMANEMENT 152 (1974); Statement by the Canadian Representative
(Barton) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Indian Nuclear Explosion, May 21, 1974, reprinted in DISARMAMENT 151.
176.

Graham, supra note 65, at 666.

177.

Id.

178. Dunn, supra note 157, at 19.
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1990s

States 17 9

As 1995 approaches and the Depository
prepare to convene
the NPT's extension meeting, 180 it is uncertain whether a majority of the
member states will vote to extend the Treaty. 81 However, from the
standpoint of world peace and stability, it is imperative that the NPT, or
some similar nonproliferation treaty, remain in force.
Despite the naysayers who dwell on the Treaty's limitations, most still
consider the NPT to be one of the most comprehensive and successful
nonproliferation treaties in history. 2 Given that nuclear weapons
proliferation will continue to pose a threat to international peace and
stability well into the future, member and nonmember states alike must
be persuaded that continuation of the Treaty is in their collective best
interests."8 To help ensure that the NPT regime will continue in force,
the Treaty's weaknesses-both real and perceived-must be addressed
and remedied to persuade ambivalent states that the Treaty should be
extended. Three primary weiknesses of the NPT regime require resolution: (1) the motivation for acquiring nuclear weapons must be reduced;
(2) the NPT regime must be strengthened and IAEA safeguards enhanced; and (3) the perceived discriminatory treatment by nuclear states
of nonnuclear states must be diminished.
A.

Reduce the Motivation to Acquire Nuclear Weapons

After the United States lost its nuclear monopoly in the late 1940s, it
became apparent that the effectiveness of supply-side proliferation controls-efforts to restrict the availability of technological information necessary to construct a nuclear device-was limited. 84 History has demonstrated that supply-side strategies can slow, but not prevent, the
proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies.1 8 5 State parties can
179. The Depository States are the the United Kingdom, the United States, and the
Soviet Union. See supra note 35.
180.

See NPT, supra note 7, art. X, para. 2, at 489-90, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173.

181. See generally Graham, supra note 65.
182. BAILEY, supra note 70, at 37.
183. See Graham, supra note 65, at 677.
184. Munir A. Khan, Towards a Universal Framework of Nuclear Restraint, in
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 45 (M.P.
Fry et al. eds., 1990). "The policy of denial has not been very effective in controlling the

spread of any modern technology." Id. at 49. "France was denied access to nuclear technology in the 1950s. It has not only attained self-sufficiency but is now a major potential
supplier of sophisticated nuclear plants and services." Id. at 49-50.
185. Harold Muller, The Nuclear Trade Regime: A Case for Strengthening the
Rules, in NUCLEAR NoN-PROLERATION AND THE NON-PROFLIFERATION TREATY,
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tighten export controls and international safeguards, but where there is a
demand, it will ultimately be filled.18 The most effective way to encourage nonproliferation, and membership in the NPT, is to reduce the
motivation to acquire nuclear weapons.
1. Security
In order to devise effective strategies to reduce demand, it is necessary
to understand why states desire nuclear weapons. Many theories have
emerged as to why states seek nuclear-weapons capability. 87 For many
states the foremost concerns are the desire to ensure national security
and defense.' 8 8 Moreover, many states are convinced that possession of

nuclear weapons will reduce or deter military threats against their strategic interests.' 89 This belief is often without merit.
While nuclear weapons may provide a military advantage in the
short-term, this advantage is often only temporary. 90 Once a state acquires nuclear weapons, its adversary often does the same.1 9' For example, after the United States built the first nuclear weapons, the Soviet
Union developed its nuclear capabilities.' 92 Fearing the Soviet Union's
nuclear capability, China followed suit.' 93 To counter China's nuclear
weapons, India developed its own. 9 Once India gained nuclear capability, Pakistan vigorously pursued a nuclear weapons program. 9 5 A simi-

supra note 184, at 19. "Many states have created some system of export controls. Yet
experience ... show[s] that these controls are far from being perfect; illegal exports and
the utilization of existing loopholes have contributed to unsafeguarded nuclear activities
in several counties." Id. at 23.
186. As with the war on drugs, when authorities eliminate one source, another
source emerges to fill its place. The same is occurring, and will continue to occur, with
nuclear material and technology. See BAILEY, supra note 70, at 137.
187. See generally STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
POSTURES FOR NON-PROLIFERATION: ARMS LIMITATION AND SECURITY POLICIES TO

MINIMIZE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 5-7 (1979) (postulating several reasons for
to seek nuclear weapons capabilities) [hereinafter SIPRI].
188. See Rathjens & Miller, supra note 134, at 26.
189. BAILEY, supra note 70, at 39.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. The Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb on August 29,
SWEET, supra note 17, at 117.
193. BAILEY, supra note 70, at 39. China detonated its first atomic bomb in
SwEET, supra note 17, at 125-26.
194. Glenn, supra note 40, at, 31. India tested its first atomic bomb in May
SWEET,

195.

supra note 17, at 138.
Glenn, supra note 40, at 31.
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lar chain reaction is emerging in the Middle East where Arab states
such as Iran, Iraq and Libya have pursued the acquisition of their own
nuclear weapons in the face of the perceived nuclear threat from
Israel.""0
In addition, as Iraq discovered in the 1981 Israeli attack on its nuclear
reactors, the mere appearance of a nuclear weapon program can actually
diminish security. Acquiring nuclear weapons can be destabilizing on a
government because it vastly changes that state's internal power structure.19 7 Various logistical questions may also arise. Should a state distribute such weapons among the several branches of the military?1" 8 Can
the head of state maintain direct control over the weapons?1 99 Is security
for the weapons adequate? Will possession of the weapons prompt a pre-

emptive strike?200 Nonnuclear-weapon states should consider each of
these questions before developing a nuclear weapons program. 0 1
Historically, when there has been a great imbalance in conventional
capabilities, weaker states have sought to acquire nuclear weapons.20 2
Promoting disarmament, encouraging security arrangements, and fostering better international relations for vulnerable states will help to remove
the impetus to acquire nuclear weapons. 20 3 For example, the United
States security arrangement with South Korea arguably has helped avert
one regional nuclear arms race.20 4

196. Id.
197.

Ulm, supra note 79, at 174; Thomas Schelling, testifying before a United States

Senate subcommittee, underscored the numerous problems inherent in maintaining a nuclear weapons arsenal: "What should a wise head of government respond if offered immediate delivery of a few nuclear weapons, free of charge? I think he or she should

respond, 'Not yet-let me think where to put them.'" Id.; see also Testimony of Thomas
Schelling, Harvard University, before the Senate Subcommittee on- Energy, Nuclear
Proliferation and Government Processes, Committee on Governmental Affairs, June 24,

1981.
198.

Id.

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Rathjens & Miller, supra note 134, at 27. For example, Israel promoted

nuclear weapons development to counter superior Arab conventional forces. South Africa
sought nuclear weapons to equalize military force with its African neighbors. Pakistan
has developed its nuclear weapons program in the face of superior Indian military forces.
See Glenn, supra note 40, at 31.
203. Rathjens & Miller, supra note 134, at 27.
204. Mutual Defense Treaty, Oct. 1, 1953, U.S.-Korea, 5 U.S.T. 2368. Other frequently cited alliances that have assisted in deterring the acquisition of nuclear weapons
are the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Mutual Cooperation Treaty
bewtween the United States and Japan. See North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63
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Status and Prestige

Many motivations prompt states to pursue nuclear weaponry.20 5 For
the United Kingdom it was status and prestige. The United Kingdom
developed nuclear weapons to demonstrate its technological prowess and
to maintain its political influence with the United States.200 For France
it was to retain its military independence. 20 7 For some Third World
states, possession of nuclear weapons has developed into a symbol of
20
achievement and status.

8

The international community must demonstrate that the possession of
nuclear weapons is no longer a source of prestige or status in international affairs.20 9 World opinion and condemnation must accompany potential proliferators' moves toward acquiring nuclear weapons. The international community should encourage other indices of prestige and
status. 210 For example, Japan and Germany have become prominent
forces in international affairs through their economic rather than military power.211
As the economic strength of nuclear-weapon states such as France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States erodes relative to nonnuclearweapon states such as Japan and Germany, states contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons should consider the high economic and political
costs of a nuclear arms race. As the former Soviet Union discovered,
possession of nuclear weapons counts for little if it results in a broken

Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Jan. 19,
1960, U.S.-Japan, 11 U.S.T. 1632.
205. SIPRI, supra note 187, at 7. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has enumerated the following reasons explaining why states seeks nuclear weapons:
(1) To deter a nuclear attack or blackmail by a nuclear-weapon state, or to defend against a superior conventional attack.
(2) To match the acquisition by a local or regional adversary.
(3) To achieve prestige and power.
(4) To achieve political independence and political status.
Id.
206.

Rathjens & Miller, supra note 134, at 26.

207. Id.
208. Dhanapala, supra note 68, at 31.
209. See Rathjens & Miller, supra note 134, at 27.
210. See id. at 32.
211. See George H. Quester & Victor A. Utgoff, U.S. Arms Reductions and Nuclear Nonproliferation:The CounterproductivePossibilities,WASH. Q., Winter 1993, at
126, 127. "[E]conomic prowess is now seen at least on par with nuclear prowess where
international political influence is concerned." Id.; Rathjens & Miller, supra note 134,
at 27.
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economy.212
3.

Limited Utility

Another way to reduce the motivation to acquire nuclear weapons is
for nuclear-weapon states to emphasize the limited utility of such weapons. The evident reluctance of nuclear-weapon states to use nuclear
weapons in military conflict sends a strong signal to the nonnuclearweapon states of the limited usefulness of nuclear weapons.2 1 In addition, the Gulf War attests to the limited deterrent value of nuclear weap-

ons. Iraq invaded Kuwait despite the strategic interests of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France, all of which possess nuclear
capabilities. 214 Argentina's seizure of the Falkland Islands from the
United Kingdom is another example. 21' The aggressors in each instance
considered the possibility of a nuclear response, but they apparently discounted that possibility.21 6
To control proliferation, the motivation for states to acquire nuclear
weapons must be curtailed. Once a state makes the decision to develop a
nuclear weapons program, it is often difficult to retreat. After initiating a
nuclear weapons program, bureaucratic "inertia develops and soon the
program takes on a life of its own."2 7 Those states initiating nuclear
weapons programs expend enormous sums of money on them. 2 8 These
programs create institutions and jobs.219 Once created, the bureaucracy
tends to build to the point where it is difficult, if not impossible, to
220
stop.
B.

Strengthen the NPT Regime

Because eliminating all possible motivations to acquire nuclear weapons will be impossible, it is imperative that the international community
encourage confidence in the NPT; therefore, it is necessary to strengthen
IAEA safeguards and controls over nuclear technologies and materials.
While the spread of knowledge is unavoidable and the secret of nuclear
weapons has all but vanished, strengthened safeguards will force poten212. Quester & Utgoff, supra note 212, at 127.
213. Glenn, supra note 40, at 29.
214. Rathjens & Miller, supra note 134, at 26.
215. Id.

216. Id.
217. BAILEY, supra note 70, at 39.
218. See id.
219. Id.
220. See id.
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tial proliferators to incur great political and economic costs if they wish
to obtain a nuclear device.22 x
Above all else, the NPT depends on the confidence of its members to
be effective. Without adequate assurances that member states are fulfilling their obligations, the Treaty regime would cease to exist. In the
wake of the Gulf War and Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program,
confidence in the NPT has diminished significantly.222 To recapture this
lost confidence, state parties must increase IAEA resources and
strengthen its safeguards. States must install effective surveillance and
detection systems and encourage accurate accounting of nuclear materials.22 3 Instruments and human monitors should be utilized to ensure accurate inspections. 224 Member states should also add sites to the IAEA's
inspection list for additional safeguard controls.2 25
To further bolster the IAEA's credibility, the IAEA needs more power
over its inspections. Under current inspection procedures, the IAEA
must obtain approval from a state before inspecting its nuclear facilities. 22 ' An unwilling state can thwart the inspection by simply refusing
the inspection or by delaying it.2 2 7 To remedy such shortcomings, the

IAEA needs the authority to conduct special inspections whereby it could
enter at will any member state's nuclear facilities even over that state's
veto.228 In addition, the public should have access to the results of IAEA
inspections, and states in violation of the NPT should be subjected to
international sanctions.229
C.

Diminish Discrimination Among States

Many states, such as Argentina, Brazil, and India object to the NPT

on the ground that it perpetuates the distinction between nuclear-weapon
and nonnuclear-weapon states.230 If the NPT is to continue in force,
reducing discrimination is imperative. One way the nuclear-weapon
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
such as

See Menon, supra note 25, at 34.
See It's Broke, So Fix It, supra note 130, at 13.
Glenn, supra note 40, at 35.
Id.
For example, the use of missile material in nonexplosive military applications,
submarine nuclear reactors, should be monitored. John Simpson, Nonproliferation Agenda Beyond 1990, BULL. ATOM. SCiENTISTS, July-Aug. 1990, at 39.
226. Paul Lewis, Atom Inspectors Seek Easier Entry, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1988, at
A9.
227. See Bombs Away, supra note 70, at 17.
228. Lewis, supra note 226, at A9.
229. It's Broke, So Fix It, supra note 130, at 13.
230. Sanders, supra note 3, at 15.
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states could address the problem would be to fulfill their Treaty obligations by entering into good faith disarmament negotiations.2 31 ' A comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing among the nuclear-weapon
states would provide a good start.23 2
The nuclear-weapon states' failure to implement a comprehensive nuclear test ban has had the effect of accentuating the belief among other
states of the desirability of nuclear weapons because it has conveyed the
message that the nuclear-weapon states still attach great importance to
nuclear weapons. 2 33 Implementation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban
will help change this. A comprehensive test ban will show the nonnuclear-weapon states that the nuclear-weapon states are serious about
nuclear disarmament, and will also advance nonproliferation goals by
making the development of nuclear weapons more difficult. 23 4 A nondiscriminatory nuclear test ban also will strengthen the nonnuclear-weapon
2 5
states' commitment to the NPT regime. 3
Both the United States and the United Kingdom oppose a full nuclear
test ban. 236 Their criticisms of such a test ban center on issues of compliance verification and national security.2 37 While the concerns of United
States and the United Kingdom were relevant a decade ago, they are
much less so today. At one time there was disagreement about the
threshold at which underground nuclear explosions could be detected
and whether such explosions could be distinguished from other seismic
activity. 238 As a result, the United States opposed a comprehensive test

ban for fear the Soviet Union might gain military advantage through
secret testing.239 Many scientists now agree, however, that modern instrumentation is sufficiently sensitive to detect and distinguish an underground nuclear explosion.240
Other factors also favor the creation of a comprehensive nuclear test
231. NPT, supra note 7, art. VI, at 490, 729 U.N.T.S. at 173. The United States
and Russia recently signed the START II Treaty, which will reduce their nuclear arsenals by two-thirds. Ann Devroy, Bush and Yeltsin, Sign Treaty to Slash NuclearArsenals, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1993, at Al.
232. See Dhanapala, supra note 68, at 31.
233. Id.
234. Schwartz, supra note 32, at 20.
235. James P. Rowles, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation:The View from Brazil, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 711, 781 (1981).
236. Keeping it in the Nuclear Family, supra note 87, at 29.
237. Glenn, supra note 40, at 32.
238. Id.
239. Rathjens & Miller, supra note 134, at 30.
240. Glenn, supra note 40, at 32.
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ban. During the Cold War years, the United States refused to consider a
full test ban, arguing that continued testing would make weapons more
reliable.24 1 However, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of
the Cold War, the additional gains through further testing pale beside
the gains that would accrue from a comprehensive test ban. Because the
issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is directly linked to extending
the NPT beyond 1995,242 implementation of such a test ban is necessary
to help persuade Treaty members that the NPT regime is indeed worth
retaining.24
V.

CONCLUSION

As 1995 approaches and the NPT extension meeting draws near, each
member to the Treaty must consider one question: Is the extension of the
Treaty in that state's best interests? A simple majority of votes will determine the NPT's fate.244 No single initiative will provide the key to the
Treaty's survival, nor will any single weakness be the source of its
downfall.245 Ultimately, each member state must weigh for itself the
costs and benefits of continuing the NPT and cast its vote accordingly.
The NPT's survival is contingent upon its members' ability to adapt
to a rapidly changing global environment. The long-term viability of

NPT will require maintaining the support of member states and attracting the support of new states. It will require reducing states' motivation to possess nuclear weapons and eliminating the discrimination between the nuclear-weapon and nonnuclear-weapon states. Ultimately,
the best way to accomplish this is for the member states to rededicate
themselves to attaining the Treaty's three basic goals: (1) halting nuclear
proliferation; (2) facilitating peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and (3)
moving toward disarmament.24 6
Like other global problems such as ozone depletion and global warming, only concerted international effort will resolve nuclear proliferation.2 47 It is imperative that the international community garner the necessary support. World peace and stability depend on it. With the
necessary support, the NPT can continue beyond 1995 and can help to

241. Jonathan Schlefer, Nuclear Terrorism, TECH. REV., Apr. 1991, at 5.
242. Rathjens & Miller, supra note 134, at 30.
243. Schlefer, supra note 241, at 5.
244. See NPT, supra note 7.
245. Dunn, supra note 157, at 20.
246. Id.
247. See Thompson, supra note 146, at 33.
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lead the transition to a "new world order of peaceful coexistence." 248
Bryan L. Sutter

248.
33.

Comments by Bush, supra note 1, at A14; see Thompson, supra note 146, at

